iglu cruise 2023

Cruise Trends of 2023

Cruise continues to be one of the fastest-growing sectors of tourism. 36 million cruise passengers are expected globally in 2024, up by 14% in 2023, according to a report by the Cruise Line International Association (CLIA)

• Demand for cruises in North America increased by 592%
• Africa increased by 253%
• British Isles increased by 33.3%

The report also states that 86% of travellers who have ever been on a cruise plan to cruise again, 6% higher than pre-pandemic levels.

With the number of cruise passengers rising globally each year, some destinations are seeing a huge increase in demand. New data by Iglu Cruise has revealed the cruising destinations that have seen the biggest trends increase in 2023.

Dave Mills, Chief Commercial Officer at Iglu Cruise, has also offered some insight into why certain destinations have seen higher levels of interest. The data was collected by comparing demand in 2022 to 2023.

North America

Top locations: fort lauderdale, miami, orlando.

Demand in North America has skyrocketed in 2023, up 592% compared to 2022. Dave Mills, Chief Commercial Officer said: “We’ve seen some very exciting new ships launched in 2023 such as Disney Wish, sailing from popular US ports such as Miami and Orlando. This could have been attributed to the huge increase in demand for cruises in North America.”

Locations such as Canada and Alaska have also seen an increase in demand, according to Google Trends Data. When comparing year on year, there is a 30 per cent increase in the term “cruise Canada”, while “cruise Alaska” is up by 17.

Miami, Florida remains the busiest cruise port in the world, with over five million visitors each year, including embarking, disembarking and port calls (CLIA). Port Canaveral, Florida is the second most visited port worldwide, with over 4.3 million visitors each year, and Cozumel, Mexico is third with over 3.8 million.

Top locations: Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban

Demand for cruising in Africa has increased by 253% compared to 2022. Google Trends data also shows an 80 per cent increase in the term “cruise Africa” in the last year.

Dave said: “We’ve seen a lot more immersive tours in Africa, particularly in South Africa. Tours of the Stellenboch Wine region, and of course, safaris have been popular bolt-ons.”

Lonely Planet also recently named South Africa as one of the best countries to visit in 2024 in their Best in Travel Report, citing Kruger National Park, where visitors can witness the Big 5, as the highlight. Morocco was also named on the list, with the Erk Chebbi dunes and Mount Jebel Toubkal, the tallest mountain in North Africa, named as some of the best attractions.

Top locations: Alesund, Bergen, Tromso

Arctic cruising trends increased by 201.3% in 2023. The Arctic Circle and specifically The Northern Lights have been steadily building for years, according to Dave Mills, with travellers wanting to catch a glimpse of the Northern Lights. He said: “We expect to see Arctic cruises continue in popularity, particularly with our dedicated Star Gazing cruises.”

Norway, Iceland and Greenland are some of the destinations that have seen demand increase. Record-breaking temperatures across southern Europe during the summer months could be a reason why we are seeing demand increase in cooler climates.

Dave added: “We’re seeing more and more travellers seeking out cooler destinations during summer to escape the intense heat in destinations such as the Mediterranean, a trend which we think will continue to rise going into 2024”.

South America

Top locations: puerto ayora, baltra, quito.

South America saw demand rise by 149.1% in 2023 compared to 2022, as well as a 32% increase in the term “South American cruise” on Google Trends.

Bucket list destinations such as the Galapagos Islands and Iguazu Falls could be the reason for this increase, according to Dave Mills.

He said: “A continent of many contrasts, South America is an attractive destination for those searching for adventure. Rugged mountains, remote rainforests, majestic waterfalls and beautiful beaches can be found in different parts of the region. The Amazon River, Christ the Redeemer and Machu Picchu are some of the world-famous tourist destinations to see and add to the bucket list.”

Top locations: Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Hong Kong

Demand in Asia increased by 98.5% in 2023, with an 80% increase in the term on Google Trends.

Dave Mills said: “Of all the long haul destinations, it was the Far East - specifically our Japan intensive cruises and tours which were the fastest to fill. Mount Fiji and Tokyo city tours are big sellers.

“Asia also offers so much diversity in terms of landscapes and culture. Destinations in Thailand, China, Singapore, Japan and Malaysia have bewildered visitors for years, with more tourists looking to see what Asia has to offer. Energetic cities mixed with beautiful landscapes and tropical climates are very attractive to travellers.”

Almost four million (3.9) cruise passengers visit Asia in 2022, according to the Cruise Line International Association, with numbers expected to increase.

Middle East

Top locations: dubai, abu dhabi, muscat.

The Middle East saw demand rise by 90.6%. This could be partly due to the addition of Doha becoming a port of call or stop-over destination, according to Dave Mills.

The ancient city of Petra, Burj Khalifa, The Dubai Fountain and Sheik Zayed Grand Mosque Center are some attractions in the Middle East that were recently awarded The Travellers Choice Best of the Best on TripAdvisor in 2023.

The Red Dunes Exploration Tour in Dubai was also awarded fourth place out of 25 top tourist activities worldwide.

Top locations: Cozumel, Philipsburg, Charlotte Amalie

Caribbean cruising trends increased by 58.8% and demand for Transatlantic cruises increased by 45.9%.

Dave Mills said: “The increase in demand in the Caribbean can be attributed to P&O Arvia, a fantastic new ship, with superb entertainment and culinary focus, which is a top seller. The signature Tidal Rum on Arvia also comes highly recommended!”

The Caribbean remains the top destination for cruise visitors, according to the State of the Cruise Industry Report by CLIA, with over 15 million visitors in 2022. Nassau, the capital of The Bahamas is also the fifth most visited port worldwide, with over 3.3 million visitors.

Top locations: Southampton, Barcelona, Lisbon

Demand for cruises in Europe has increased by 32.9%. Dave Mills said: “Closer to home, many cruise lines have dedicated some of their best ships to serve the European markets. Anthem of the Seas from Southampton, Sky Princess, P&O Iona and MSC Virtuosa have all helped swell booking numbers in Europe.”

Northern Europe is the second-most visited location for cruise travellers, according to CLIA, with the Eastern Mediterranean in sixth place.

Barcelona is also the seventh most visited port in the world, and the first most visited in Europe, with over 2.5 million visitors each year. Southampton is the ninth most visited port in the world, with over 2 million yearly visitors.

British Isles

Top locations: southampton, belfast, kirkwall.

Cruising trends in the British Isles have increased by 33.3% in 2023.

Dave Mills said: “We see the same demand in Europe reflected on the British Isles. We have found the demand for UK coastal cruises which peaked out of necessity in 2021 has maintained year after year since.”

Data from GOV UK suggests that over two million cruise passengers visit the British Isles every year, with 89% of those passing through Southampton. Since the pandemic, there has also been an increase in demand for no-fly cruises.

Other ports in the British Isles include Belfast, Kirkwall, Invergordan and Lerwick.

Suggested companies

Planet cruise, cruise.co.uk, p&o cruises.

IgluCruise   Reviews

In the Cruise agency category

Visit this website

Company activity See all

Write a review

Reviews 4.8.

48,131 total

Most relevant

Efficient, quality service

We received a call back shortly after our initial enquiry. Our consultant was very friendly and helpful. She talked us through the options and gave full information about flights, hotel and available cabins. Also advice on passports and where to check for any entry requirements etc. All was handled very efficiently. The price was as listed on the web site with no unexpected extras.

Date of experience : 09 August 2024

IGLU are the best Company to book a Cruise through....

Have used Iglu a few times now and have always been brilliant... Today Mark Williams arranged our latest cruise with P&O to the Western Mediterranean in April 2025 ... He gave us some excellent advice and information and quickly and professionally dealt with our booking. Would never ever think of using any other 'Cruise booking Company' .. Iglu are simply the best ..Thank you Mark .. David & Cheryl, Bridlington

Date of experience : 08 August 2024

A short while before confirming our Christmas cruise 2024, my wife had a health problem which meant she had to wait for an MRI scan. This naturally had implications when organising the insurance. Naturally insurance companies will not cover without a diagnosis. This meant I had to get in touch for advice from Iglu. I was put through to Sue Parr who was very patient and understanding with our problem. She explained clearly what we could do and went to great lengths to find us an equivalent cruise for 2025. I cannot thank Sue enough for her help and therefore Iglu for having such helpful and understanding colleagues.

Date of experience : 06 August 2024

Although a bit frustrated by slow…

Although a bit frustrated by slow responses to my online request for support, both team members I spoke with eventually were outstandingly helpful, polite and knowledgeable. I know it's not their fault that there is a delay to answering queries. Both were a real credit to the company.

Chose Iglu for the competitive price of…

Chose Iglu for the competitive price of our cruise. 2025 Norwegian fjords. Communication very good. Updated and reminders regularly. We are new to cruising, but so far it has been made easy through Iglu. Plenty of information.

Date of experience : 02 August 2024

The personal touch won me over.

The upside was that the agents I spoke to (Liam & Molly?) could not have been more helpful. The downside was that I did not receive an email (as stated upon completion of the booking) which caused some anxiety as payment had been debited from my account - I had to wait several hours until office opening hours the following morning for some reassurance; a voucher was not actioned (I have a screenshot which said it had been); I was transferred to customer services who did not pick up. I waited for over 20 minutes before ringing off. All said, the experience of dealing directly with Liam & Molly has left me willing to use IgluCruise in future - subject to a positive cruise experience of course!

The Igloo specialist Dom is fully…

The Igloo specialist Dom is fully cognisant of the intricacies and likely whims of cruisers and is able to answer questions fully. He calls back when he says he would and fulfills his promised actions. I’ll request his services when I next book through Igloo.

Marie who we spoke to from Iglu cruises…

Marie who we spoke to from Iglu cruises did a great job, everything was explained in simple English and she was very knowledgeable. She made the whole process of booking straight forward and simple and had a very pleasant attitude. Would highly recommend using this company 5*

Booking Experience

I spoke with Jack Lee on a few occasions. He was super helpful and very patient. I had a few questions which he always answered in full and quite truthfully he made the whole booking process very easy. Really looking forward to our holiday to South Africa and beyond in January 2025.

Date of experience : 07 August 2024

Helpful and understanding

My cruise consultant was really patient and understanding with me. He kept me updated constantly with availability, and wasnt pushy at all. I would recommend booking with Iglu again, this is my second booking with Iglu and have found them to give excellent customer service.

Date of experience : 01 August 2024

Great booking service

The webpage is easy to navigate through and it is easy to find the right cruise. My request for a quote was promptly answered with detailed information. When I called to ask further questions and in the end to book the cruise, Anthony was very helpful and patient and explained whatever I needed and wanted to know. I can recommend their services so far. (Cruise not yet done)

I had to move my cruise and Mike helped…

I had to move my cruise and Mike helped me find another cruise that suited our needs. He is very professional and went out of his way to accommodate us. I would have no hesitation booking with iglucruise again

Spoke to Seb who was excellent and went…

Spoke to Seb who was excellent and went above and beyond to help me cancel a cruise and rebook another due to operation appointment. Sorted everything out with me in a very pleasant manner and couldn’t speak more highly of his professional manner. Most impressed.

Phil O’Donnell was Absolutely Fabulous

Phil O’Donnell was Absolutely Fabulous! Catered for my mum’s disability and found us the perfect cruise! Will always book through Phil in future.

Mark was a really great help when i was booking our family holiday. He helped me find a discount and was informative of the cruise that i had booked along with benefits such as parking and onboard credit

IgluCruise are second to none.

I must say that we have been with several cruise companies in the past, but IgluCruise surpass them all by a long way. There Customer Service is second to none. I would recommend IgluCruise to anyone who wants to enjoy a great holiday on the sea.

Date of experience : 31 July 2024

Katie - brilliant

The representative Katie was informative, helpful and very efficient. The whole transaction was seamless and took less than 5 minutes. We have only discovered Iglu in the last year and this is out second, of 3 cruises booked. Our first ' port of call ' - sorry, will be Iglu and we will recommend them to all out friends and family.

Overall good

Phil Odonnell was extremely helpful. He was able to organise our holiday well and provided all relevant information. He had to call me back and did so at a time promised. Frustratingly, we were only able to choose a cabin number for one of the two cabins we booked, despite booking the option where we had a choice of cabin number and location. When I asked about this I was told "They are booked on Guaranteed fare, This means their cabin will be allocated to them once they get onboard". This is not what was advertised on this rate which was disappointing. Overall we had a good experience. Bear in mind we have only just booked the cruise and have not "completed" it yet!

Date of experience : 29 July 2024

Couldn't decide on which cruise to…

Couldn't decide on which cruise to choose out of 2 we short listed. Barbara the agent did not pick one for us but went through both itineraries explaining what times we would be on both cruises etc and then left the decision to us.

Great response from cruise specialist

The Cruise Specialist - Daniel Forsyth provides a fast response and good quotation for us to decide to book with Iglu. For future cruise will get Daniel's help.

Travel Industry News by ITB : Daily Travel & Tourism News

Primary Navigation

— Registration Number: SIRET 413 604 471 — Professional Bodies: SYNTHEC — Company’s Director: Jean-françois PIERI CLEVERDIS — RCS Number: 413604471 SALON-DE-PROVENCE — Legal Form: CLEVERDIS SAS — VAT Number: TVA FR95413604471

3 OF THE BEST WORLD CRUISES ON OFFER IN 2023/24

Iglu cruise and planet cruise have rounded up three of their most impressive world cruises for 2023 and 2024 offering passengers impeccable service aboard luxury vessels., ultimate world cruise.

The Ultimate World Cruise will embark on a 277-night world voyage to all seven continents in December 2023.

Planet Cruise is offering luxury packages aboard Royal Caribbean’s Serenade of the Seas from £44,999 (€53,272) per person with flights departing from London to Miami on December 8.

Prices include business class flights, a two-night hotel stay in Miami, shore excursions and gratuities, and a deluxe drinks package based on an inside cabin.

The cruise liner will visit more than 60 countries and 11 New World Wonders.

Highlights include a day at Royal Caribbean’s exclusive island, CocoCay in the Bahamas, the Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro, the geothermal pools of Iceland and the floating city of Venice.

Guests will enjoy 13 decks of entertainment and accommodation onboard with exceptional restaurants, sports court, mini golf, a spa and fitness centre and rock climbing.

World Cruise

Planet Cruise is also offering a 99-night adult only voyage onboard P&O Cruises’ Arcadia from £9,699 per person.

The cruise liner will depart from Southampton on January 6, 2024 to some of the world’s most extraordinary destinations.

Prices include meals and snacks onboard, free onboard spend and gratuities based on an inside cabin.

Highlights include Sydney Opera House, shipwreck diving off the Caribbean island of Aruba, sailing around the Whitsunday Islands of Australia, and Hawaii’s Pearl Harbour National Memorial in Honolulu.

Guests will also visit Hong Kong, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Dubai.

The luxury vessel offers West End shows, two swimming pools, an ocean view gym and fitness centre, golf nets and a library.

Centenary World Voyage

Iglu Cruise is offering a 93-night trip aboard Cunard’s Queen Victoria from £13,133 per person, departing on January 19, 2023.

Guests can expect fine dining, immersive shore experiences and glamorous evening entertainment onboard the Cunard’s second largest cruise liner which will sail from New York to Southampton.

Flights, transfers gratuities, and onboard meals are included within the prise which is based on an inside cabin.

Itinerary highlights include departure from New York, the Caribbean beaches of St Maarten, the Axtec ruins of Mexico, the Golden Gate Bridge of San Francisco and scuba diving on the Great Barrier Reef in Australia.

Guests will also visit parts of Asia including Nha Trang city in Vietnam, Singapore and Sri Lanka.

Leave a Comment Cancel Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You Might Also Like:

M/y ciao: a superyacht symbol of crn’s innovation and expertise, the captivating mediterranean cruise of the msc poesia planned this autumn, ponant ushers in a new era of carbon-free cruising with its revolutionary new vessel,   industry news.

Drag to scroll

• +33 (0)4 42 77 46 00
• [email protected]

Legal Notices

• Cookie Policy (EU)
• Data Protection

Iglu Cruises Blog Ultra Luxury World Cruises 2023, 2024, 2025

Ultra-luxury world cruises 2023, 2024 and 2025has travelling the world been on your bucket list well if so, do it in style and comfort with our fantastic ultra luxury world voyages and grand voyages packed with a variety of entertainment, exquisite restaurants, butler service and an extraordinary variety of suites, you're guaranteed to not only have that homely feel while at sea exploring the world but also ensure you are well rested for when you visit the many stunning ports on each unique itinerary.set sail in 2023, 2024 or 2025 and have the holiday of a lifetime see all our ultra luxury world cruise deals below: silversea world cruisessilver shadow world cruise 2025south side story - full 2023 world cruise - 8th january 2023 (141 nights) from sydney to fort lauderdaletop ports of call: sydney, walvis bay & hong kong silver dawn world cruise 2025controtempo - 2025 world cruise - 11th january 2025 (139 nights) from tokyo to new yorktop ports of call: luxor (safaga), egypt, new york & osaka. regent seven seas world cruisesregent seven seas mariner world cruise 2023navigate the world 2023 - beyond the horizon - 6th january 2023 (144 nights) from miami to barcelonatop ports of call: bora bora, singapore & agadir regent seven seas mariner world cruise 2024navigate the world 2024 - moments in time - 5th january 2024 (134 nights) miami roundtriptop ports of call: hanga roa (easter island), taipei (keelung) & dubai regent seven seas mariner world cruise 2025navigate the world 2025 - away in wonder - 6th january 2025 (152 nights) from miami to san franciscotop ports of call: punta arenas, papeete (tahiti) & koh samui regent seven seas grand voyagesregent seven seas mariner grand voyage 2024grand arctic adventure - 1st june 2024 (84 nights) from new york to barcelonatop ports of call: lima, ferrol & barcelona regent seven seas voyager grand voyage 2024grand european sojourn - 28th june 2024 (79 nights) lisbon round triptop ports of call: nantes, athens & valletta regent seven seas explorer grand voyage 2024grand asia exploration 17th october 2024 (65 nights) from tokyo to sydneytop ports of call: shimizu, tha trang & bangkok regent seven seas voyager grand voyage 2025grand spice route quest 24th march 2025 (71 nights) from auckland to athenstop ports of call: salalah, cochin (india) & muscat seabourn world cruisesseabourn sojourn full world cruise 2023extraordinary discoveries - 2023 full world cruise - 5 january 2023 (141 nights) from miami to casablancatop ports of call: paria, melbourne & key west seabourn sojourn full world cruise 2024extraordinary horizons - 2024 full world cruise - 10 january 2024 (146 nights) from los angeles to athenstop ports of call: wellington, hiroshima & coron seabourn grand voyagesseabourn quest grand voyage 2023grand americas, amazon & antarctica - 2023 grand voyage - 6 january 2023 (79 nights) from miamitop ports of call: punta de bombon (peru), san juan & montevideo see here all our other world cruises, followers on owler.

Richard Downs

CEO Approval Rating

Iglu Cruises is an online portal that provides cruises deals, offers and information services.

Ravish Magazine

Luxury Lifestyle UK

IGLU CRUISE AND PLANET CRUISE: CRUISE OF THE WEEK AND LATE DEALS

Experience a different kind of city break with iglu cruise and planet cruise’s short european getaways. from paris to amsterdam, there are destinations fit for all. more details to be found below. .

Cruise of the week…

Summer Bank Holiday Bruges & Amsterdam from Southampton , 25 August 2023 (4 nights)

Iglu Cruise ( www.iglucruise.com ; 02037 335 557) is offering a 4-night cruise onboard Celebrity Cruises’  Celebrity Silhouette  from £528 per person departing from Southampton on 25 August 2023. Price is based on an inside cabin and includes up to $800 free onboard spend with flexible booking terms.

Departing from Southampton, guests spend a day in Belgium’s bustling capital city Brussels (Zebrugge). To capture the highlights of Zebrugge within a short amount of time, visit the 5th century Grand Place for breathtaking architecture and live music, while the Palais Royal offers a glimpse into the life of the Royals. The next port of call is one of Europe’s most popular destinations, Amsterdam, where cruisers can visit iconic hidden gems including the Anne Frank House, Rijksmuseum and the Van Gogh Museum. Time onboard can be spent in one of 13 restaurants with cuisine for everyone’s taste, in one of the 4 swimming pools or soaking up eye-catching works of art within the gallery.

IGLU CRUISE AND PLANET CRUISE SELECTED LATE DEALS

Paris Short Break from Southampton , 1 September 2023 (3 nights)

Planet Cruise ( www.planetcruise.com ; 0808 278 8504) is offering a 3-night cruise onboard Cunard Queen Mary 2 from £379 (save £12 if you book online) per person departing from Southampton (no fly cruise) on 1 September 2023. The price is based on an inside cabin with a deposit of £76 per person.

Departing from Southampton, this short trip will take guests on a luxury cruise to Le Havre (Paris) for the day. This destination has plenty to offer such as the Musée des Beaux-Arts and D-Day beaches. Those looking to delve deeper, can go on an optional excursion to Mont St Michel, the medieval town of Rouen or travel into Paris and spot the iconic Eiffel Tower. Time onboard can be spent in one of Cunard’s fine dining restaurants, relaxing at the Canyon Ranch and Spa Club or enjoying some high-quality entertainment at the Royal Court Theatre. 

Europe Getaway from Southampton , 15 April 2023 (4 nights)

Iglu Cruise ( www.iglucruise.com ; 02037 335 557) is offering a 4-night cruise onboard Princess Cruises  Sky Princess  from £299 per person (save £10 when booking online), departing from Southampton on 15 April 2023. Price is based on an inside cabin and includes a low deposit.

Setting sail from Southampton, this voyage firstly explores Rotterdam. For shopping, bars and restaurants head to the Markthal, a unique building with plenty to enjoy. Meanwhile, families will love Rotterdam Zoo, as well as the Euromast Tower which provides stunning views across the city. Cruising on, the next destination for this Europe getaway is Bruges (Zeebrugge). With gothic and neo-Gothic architecture throughout the quaint streets and canals, there’s plenty of history and culture to discover. Visit the Markt and Belfort’s stunning views of the city or enjoy a boat ride around the canals for a  scenic city tour. Time can be spent relaxing in the beauty gallery and seaview bar or enjoying a game of mini golf. 

Top Hair Trends We Love

The Best Foodie Gifts for Mother’s Day, with Love from Malton!

Recommended Articles

Top City Breaks To Do This Year

LUXURY MEETS ROMANCE: Wonderful Weddings at Raffles Doha

From Frankfurt to New York: A Tale of Two Skylines

Leave a reply cancel reply.

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

44 Facts About Krasnodar

Written by Margo Rhone

Modified & Updated: 25 Jun 2024

Reviewed by Sherman Smith

Krasnodar is a vibrant and fascinating city located in the southern part of Russia. Known for its rich history, diverse culture, and stunning natural landscapes, Krasnodar offers an array of attractions and experiences for visitors to enjoy. From its iconic architecture to its delicious cuisine, this city truly has something for everyone.

In this article, we will explore 44 intriguing facts about Krasnodar. Whether you’re planning a trip to this dynamic city or simply want to learn more about it, you’ll find plenty of interesting tidbits to satisfy your curiosity. So, let’s dive in and uncover the hidden gems of Krasnodar!

Key Takeaways:

• Krasnodar, the 16th largest city in Russia, offers a warm climate, vibrant culinary scene, and rich cultural heritage, making it a beautiful gift for visitors and residents alike.
• With its diverse culture, thriving community, and rich history, Krasnodar provides something for everyone to enjoy, from outdoor activities to vibrant cultural events.

Krasnodar is the 16th largest city in Russia.

Located in the southern part of the country, Krasnodar occupies an area of about 300 square kilometers.

The city’s name translates to “beautiful gift” in Russian.

Krasnodar was named by Catherine the Great in 1794, who was impressed by the natural beauty of the region.

Krasnodar is the capital of Krasnodar Krai.

Krasnodar Krai is a federal subject of Russia , and Krasnodar serves as its administrative center.

The city is known for its warm climate.

Krasnodar experiences hot summers with temperatures reaching up to 35°C (95°F) and mild winters with temperatures rarely dropping below freezing.

Krasnodar is a major transportation hub.

The city is well-connected by air, rail, and road networks, making it a crucial transportation node in southern Russia.

Krasnodar is home to the popular FC Krasnodar football team.

FC Krasnodar competes in the Russian Premier League and has gained a significant following in the region.

The city is known for its vibrant culinary scene.

Krasnodar offers a wide variety of restaurants, cafes, and street food stalls serving both traditional Russian cuisine and international dishes.

Krasnodar is a major agricultural center.

The fertile land surrounding the city is ideal for agriculture, and Krasnodar is known for its production of grains, fruits, and vegetables.

Krasnodar is home to the Kuban River.

The Kuban River flows through the city, providing a picturesque backdrop and recreational opportunities for residents and visitors.

Krasnodar has a rich cultural heritage.

The city boasts numerous museums, theaters, and art galleries, showcasing the history and artistic talent of the region.

The famous artist Ivan Shishkin was born in Krasnodar.

Ivan Shishkin is one of Russia’s most renowned landscape painters and is known for his realistic and detailed depictions of nature.

Krasnodar is known for its annual Krasnodar Jazz Festival.

The Krasnodar Jazz Festival attracts jazz musicians and enthusiasts from around the world, showcasing both local talents and international artists.

The city is a cultural melting pot.

Krasnodar is home to people of various ethnicities, contributing to its diverse cultural landscape.

Krasnodar is famous for its traditional Cossack culture.

The Cossacks have a strong presence in Krasnodar, and their customs, dances, and music are celebrated throughout the city.

Krasnodar is a popular destination for outdoor activities.

The surrounding area offers opportunities for hiking, camping, and exploring the beautiful nature reserves and national parks.

The city is a center for higher education.

Krasnodar is home to several universities and colleges, attracting students from all over Russia and abroad.

Krasnodar has a thriving business and entrepreneurial ecosystem.

The city has experienced significant economic growth, with a range of industries contributing to its success.

Krasnodar has a bustling nightlife scene.

There are numerous bars, clubs, and entertainment venues where locals and visitors can enjoy music, dancing, and socializing.

Krasnodar hosts the annual Krasnodar International Film Festival.

The film festival showcases local and international films, attracting filmmakers and cinema enthusiasts.

The city has a well-developed public transportation system.

Krasnodar offers a network of buses, trams, and trolleybuses, making it convenient for residents and tourists to get around.

Krasnodar is home to the largest open-air market in southern Russia.

The central market, known as “Tsentralniy Rynok,” offers a wide variety of fresh produce, clothing, and other goods.

The city has hosted international sports events.

Krasnodar has been a host city for major events such as the FIFA World Cup and the European Athletics Championships.

Krasnodar is a center for healthcare and medical research.

The city is home to state-of-the-art medical facilities and renowned research institutes .

Krasnodar is known for its beautiful parks and gardens.

The city boasts numerous green spaces where residents can relax, exercise, and enjoy nature.

Krasnodar is experiencing rapid urban development.

The city’s skyline is continuously evolving with the construction of new residential and commercial buildings.

The city has a rich history dating back to ancient times.

Archaeological discoveries in the region have revealed traces of early civilizations that once thrived in Krasnodar.

Krasnodar is a city of sports enthusiasts.

From football and basketball to martial arts and water sports, Krasnodar offers a wide range of sporting activities and facilities.

The city is known for its warm and welcoming locals.

Krasnodar residents are known for their hospitality and friendly nature.

Krasnodar has a vibrant music scene.

The city hosts music festivals and concerts throughout the year, showcasing a variety of genres and talents.

Krasnodar has a developed network of bike lanes.

Cycling enthusiasts can explore the city and its surroundings using the extensive bike paths available.

Krasnodar has a rich tradition of folk dances and music.

Traditional dance groups and music ensembles perform regularly, preserving the cultural heritage of the region.

The city has a thriving technology sector.

Krasnodar is home to numerous tech startups and companies driving innovation in various fields.

Krasnodar is famous for its vibrant food markets.

Locals and tourists flock to the markets to find fresh produce, local delicacies, and traditional Russian ingredients.

Krasnodar has a strong sense of community.

Residents actively engage in volunteer work and community initiatives, fostering a close-knit and supportive environment.

The city has a rich architectural heritage.

From historical buildings to modern structures, Krasnodar showcases a blend of architectural styles.

Krasnodar is a gateway to the Black Sea coast.

The city’s proximity to popular coastal destinations makes it an ideal starting point for beach getaways.

Krasnodar celebrates various cultural festivals throughout the year.

The city embraces diversity by hosting festivals that showcase the traditions and customs of different ethnic groups.

Krasnodar has a well-established theater scene.

From classical plays to contemporary performances, theater enthusiasts can enjoy a range of productions in the city.

The city is known for its innovative urban planning.

Krasnodar has implemented modern urban planning principles to create livable and sustainable neighborhoods.

Krasnodar has a strong sense of environmental awareness.

Efforts are made to preserve the natural beauty of the region and promote eco-friendly practices within the city.

The city is home to the Kuban State University.

Kuban State University is one of the oldest and most prestigious educational institutions in southern Russia.

Krasnodar is a center for sports medicine.

The city offers state-of-the-art medical facilities and professionals specialized in sports-related injuries and rehabilitation.

Krasnodar has a well-developed retail sector.

From shopping malls to boutique stores, residents and visitors have access to a wide variety of retail options.

Krasnodar is known for its vibrant cultural events.

Throughout the year, the city hosts festivals, concerts, and exhibitions that showcase the creative talents of its residents.

As you can see, Krasnodar is a city with a rich history, diverse culture, and thriving community. From its warm climate to its vibrant culinary scene, there is something for everyone to enjoy in this beautiful gift of a city.

In conclusion, Krasnodar is a vibrant city that offers a wealth of history, culture, and natural beauty. With its rich architectural heritage, delicious cuisine, and friendly locals, it is no wonder that Krasnodar is a popular destination for travelers from all over the world. Whether you are interested in exploring the city’s museums and art galleries, experiencing its lively nightlife, or simply indulging in its delicious local dishes, Krasnodar has something for everyone. So, if you are looking for an exciting and memorable travel experience, be sure to add Krasnodar to your bucket list.

1. What is the best time to visit Krasnodar?

The best time to visit Krasnodar is during the spring and autumn seasons when the weather is pleasant and mild. Summers can be quite hot and humid, while winters are cold with occasional snowfall.

2. How can I reach Krasnodar?

Krasnodar is well-connected by air, rail, and road. The city has an international airport, and there are regular flights from major cities in Russia and Europe. Additionally, there are train and bus services available for travelers.

3. Are there any must-visit attractions in Krasnodar?

Yes, there are several must-visit attractions in Krasnodar. Some of the popular ones include the Kuban State University Botanical Garden, Krasnodar Regional Art Museum, Red Street, and the Krasnodar Safari Park.

4. Is it safe to travel to Krasnodar?

Yes, Krasnodar is generally a safe city to visit. However, it is always recommended to take normal precautions and be aware of your surroundings, especially in crowded areas.

5. What is the local cuisine like in Krasnodar?

The local cuisine in Krasnodar is diverse and delicious. Some popular dishes include Kuban-style barbecued meats, borscht ( beetroot soup), pirozhki (stuffed pastries), and traditional Russian desserts like blini (thin pancakes) and medovik (honey cake).

6. Are there any outdoor activities to do in Krasnodar?

Yes, there are plenty of outdoor activities to enjoy in Krasnodar. You can visit the beautiful parks and gardens, go hiking in the nearby mountains, or explore the stunning countryside on a bike tour.

7. Can I take day trips from Krasnodar?

Absolutely! Krasnodar is a great base for day trips to nearby attractions such as the Black Sea coast, the picturesque town of Gelendzhik, and the historic city of Anapa.

8. Is English widely spoken in Krasnodar?

While English is not widely spoken, you can still manage to communicate with basic English in major tourist areas. Having a few basic Russian phrases handy can also be helpful.

Krasnodar's vibrant sports scene is just one facet of this captivating city. Football enthusiasts will enjoy learning more about FC Krasnodar's impressive history and accomplishments . Kuban Krasnodar, another prominent local club , has its own intriguing tale to tell. For those curious about the visionary behind Krasnodar's transformation, Sergey Galitsky's fascinating story is a must-read.

Was this page helpful?

Our commitment to delivering trustworthy and engaging content is at the heart of what we do. Each fact on our site is contributed by real users like you, bringing a wealth of diverse insights and information. To ensure the highest standards of accuracy and reliability, our dedicated editors meticulously review each submission. This process guarantees that the facts we share are not only fascinating but also credible. Trust in our commitment to quality and authenticity as you explore and learn with us.

Share this Fact:

Suggested companies

Planet cruise, cruise.co.uk, p&o cruises.

IgluCruise   Reviews

In the Cruise Agency category

Visit this website

Company activity See all

Write a review

Reviews 4.8.

48,131 total

Most relevant

Efficient, quality service

We received a call back shortly after our initial enquiry. Our consultant was very friendly and helpful. She talked us through the options and gave full information about flights, hotel and available cabins. Also advice on passports and where to check for any entry requirements etc. All was handled very efficiently. The price was as listed on the web site with no unexpected extras.

Date of experience : August 09, 2024

IGLU are the best Company to book a Cruise through....

Have used Iglu a few times now and have always been brilliant... Today Mark Williams arranged our latest cruise with P&O to the Western Mediterranean in April 2025 ... He gave us some excellent advice and information and quickly and professionally dealt with our booking. Would never ever think of using any other 'Cruise booking Company' .. Iglu are simply the best ..Thank you Mark .. David & Cheryl, Bridlington

Date of experience : August 08, 2024

A short while before confirming our Christmas cruise 2024, my wife had a health problem which meant she had to wait for an MRI scan. This naturally had implications when organising the insurance. Naturally insurance companies will not cover without a diagnosis. This meant I had to get in touch for advice from Iglu. I was put through to Sue Parr who was very patient and understanding with our problem. She explained clearly what we could do and went to great lengths to find us an equivalent cruise for 2025. I cannot thank Sue enough for her help and therefore Iglu for having such helpful and understanding colleagues.

Date of experience : August 06, 2024

Although a bit frustrated by slow…

Although a bit frustrated by slow responses to my online request for support, both team members I spoke with eventually were outstandingly helpful, polite and knowledgeable. I know it's not their fault that there is a delay to answering queries. Both were a real credit to the company.

Chose Iglu for the competitive price of…

Chose Iglu for the competitive price of our cruise. 2025 Norwegian fjords. Communication very good. Updated and reminders regularly. We are new to cruising, but so far it has been made easy through Iglu. Plenty of information.

Date of experience : August 02, 2024

The personal touch won me over.

The upside was that the agents I spoke to (Liam & Molly?) could not have been more helpful. The downside was that I did not receive an email (as stated upon completion of the booking) which caused some anxiety as payment had been debited from my account - I had to wait several hours until office opening hours the following morning for some reassurance; a voucher was not actioned (I have a screenshot which said it had been); I was transferred to customer services who did not pick up. I waited for over 20 minutes before ringing off. All said, the experience of dealing directly with Liam & Molly has left me willing to use IgluCruise in future - subject to a positive cruise experience of course!

The Igloo specialist Dom is fully…

The Igloo specialist Dom is fully cognisant of the intricacies and likely whims of cruisers and is able to answer questions fully. He calls back when he says he would and fulfills his promised actions. I’ll request his services when I next book through Igloo.

Marie who we spoke to from Iglu cruises…

Marie who we spoke to from Iglu cruises did a great job, everything was explained in simple English and she was very knowledgeable. She made the whole process of booking straight forward and simple and had a very pleasant attitude. Would highly recommend using this company 5*

Booking Experience

I spoke with Jack Lee on a few occasions. He was super helpful and very patient. I had a few questions which he always answered in full and quite truthfully he made the whole booking process very easy. Really looking forward to our holiday to South Africa and beyond in January 2025.

Date of experience : August 07, 2024

Helpful and understanding

My cruise consultant was really patient and understanding with me. He kept me updated constantly with availability, and wasnt pushy at all. I would recommend booking with Iglu again, this is my second booking with Iglu and have found them to give excellent customer service.

Date of experience : August 01, 2024

Great booking service

The webpage is easy to navigate through and it is easy to find the right cruise. My request for a quote was promptly answered with detailed information. When I called to ask further questions and in the end to book the cruise, Anthony was very helpful and patient and explained whatever I needed and wanted to know. I can recommend their services so far. (Cruise not yet done)

I had to move my cruise and Mike helped…

I had to move my cruise and Mike helped me find another cruise that suited our needs. He is very professional and went out of his way to accommodate us. I would have no hesitation booking with iglucruise again

Spoke to Seb who was excellent and went…

Spoke to Seb who was excellent and went above and beyond to help me cancel a cruise and rebook another due to operation appointment. Sorted everything out with me in a very pleasant manner and couldn’t speak more highly of his professional manner. Most impressed.

Phil O’Donnell was Absolutely Fabulous

Phil O’Donnell was Absolutely Fabulous! Catered for my mum’s disability and found us the perfect cruise! Will always book through Phil in future.

Mark was a really great help when i was booking our family holiday. He helped me find a discount and was informative of the cruise that i had booked along with benefits such as parking and onboard credit

IgluCruise are second to none.

I must say that we have been with several cruise companies in the past, but IgluCruise surpass them all by a long way. There Customer Service is second to none. I would recommend IgluCruise to anyone who wants to enjoy a great holiday on the sea.

Date of experience : July 31, 2024

Katie - brilliant

The representative Katie was informative, helpful and very efficient. The whole transaction was seamless and took less than 5 minutes. We have only discovered Iglu in the last year and this is out second, of 3 cruises booked. Our first ' port of call ' - sorry, will be Iglu and we will recommend them to all out friends and family.

Overall good

Phil Odonnell was extremely helpful. He was able to organise our holiday well and provided all relevant information. He had to call me back and did so at a time promised. Frustratingly, we were only able to choose a cabin number for one of the two cabins we booked, despite booking the option where we had a choice of cabin number and location. When I asked about this I was told "They are booked on Guaranteed fare, This means their cabin will be allocated to them once they get onboard". This is not what was advertised on this rate which was disappointing. Overall we had a good experience. Bear in mind we have only just booked the cruise and have not "completed" it yet!

Date of experience : July 29, 2024

Couldn't decide on which cruise to…

Couldn't decide on which cruise to choose out of 2 we short listed. Barbara the agent did not pick one for us but went through both itineraries explaining what times we would be on both cruises etc and then left the decision to us.

Great response from cruise specialist

The Cruise Specialist - Daniel Forsyth provides a fast response and good quotation for us to decide to book with Iglu. For future cruise will get Daniel's help.

Search form

• Publications
• Get Involved
• Planned Giving

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2024

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 8, 2024, 10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: Russian sources are currently shifting much of their reporting to cover the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and as a result are not providing the same level of detail about the situation along the frontline in Ukraine.

Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security. ISW will not make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do or where or when they might do it. ISW will continue to map, track, and evaluate operations as they unfold but will not offer insight into Ukrainian planning, tactics, or techniques. ISW is not prepared to map control of terrain within Russia at this time and will instead map observed events associated with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as well the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances within Russia do not represent territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or control. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.

Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced as far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (up to 35 kilometers from the international border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) but noted that these are small groups not immediately trying to hold territory. [1] Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only seized part of the settlement. [2] Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced further north of Sudzha along the 38K-024 highway near Anastasyevka. [3] Geolocated footage published on August 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka. [4] A geolocated photo shows Ukrainian forces operating within Novoivanovka (10km north of the international border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha). [5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha near Mirny, although two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are operating near and within Bolshoye Soldatskoye. [6] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked within Snagost (south of Korenevo) and near Olgovka (east of Korenevo). [7]

Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored groups are advancing further into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications before engaging Russian forces and then withdrawing from the engagements without attempting to consolidate control over their furthest advances. [8] Russian milbloggers noted that the prevalence of these armored groups is leading to conflicting reporting because Ukrainian forces are able to quickly engage Russian forces near a settlement and then withdraw from the area. [9] Ukrainian forces appear to be able to use these small armored groups to conduct assaults past the engagement line due to the low density of Russian personnel in the border areas of Kursk Oblast. Larger Ukrainian units are reportedly operating in areas of Kursk Oblast closer to the international border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions. [10]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully fielding novel and innovative tactics and technological capabilities during operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers have provided details on Ukrainian tactics and technological capabilities that they regard as innovative, but ISW will not describe such details at this time or point to specific sources in order to preserve Ukrainian operational security.

The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence. Putin held a virtual meeting with Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov on August 8 about Ukraine's operations into the oblast and stated that he "generally know[s] the situation" but still would like to hear Smirnov's assessment of the situation. [11] Smirnov and Putin did not discuss Russian attempts to repel Ukrainian forces and portrayed the Russian government as effectively working to ensure civilian safety and social and monetary compensation. Russian milbloggers have highlighted concerns over the safety of Russian civilians and disorganized civilian evacuations. [12] Putin likely assesses that he must respond to the perceived threat to civilians in order to assure the Russian public that the situation is under control and avoid significant domestic discontent. Smirnov claimed on August 7 that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control," directly linking Russian success in repelling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and mitigating related civilian issues to Putin. [13] The Kremlin previously has portrayed itself as capable of swiftly responding to pro-Ukrainian raids into Russia, and the Kremlin likely assesses that significant Ukrainian territorial gains in Russia would pose a threat to the Kremlin's efforts to frame itself as a stable regime in control of the internal security situation within Russia and an effective manager of the war in Ukraine. [14]

If Russian reporting on the situation in Kursk Oblast is accurate and if the Russian military command perceives the situation to be the same as Russian sources have described, then the Russian military command has an array of likely courses of action (COAs) it could pursue to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW is not prepared at this time to assess which of these possible COAs is most likely, and it is possible that the Russian military command may not rely on only one COA to respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command's decision-making will be influenced by its perception of the size and capability of Ukrainian forces in the area, about which ISW makes no assessment. The following COAs are not presented in order of likelihood.

• COA 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have repeatedly assured Russians that conscripts will not deploy to combat operations along the frontline in Ukraine, and instead, the Russian military command has relied on conscripts for staffing units in charge of border security functions along the international border with Ukraine. [15] Russian conscripts, FSB border guards, and elements of Chechen "Akhmat" units operating under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reportedly currently operating in Kursk Oblast. [16] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) irregular forces, including elements of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas," the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, the "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, and the "Night Wolves" drone detachment, arrived in Kursk Oblast. [17] Elements of a battalion of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment were reportedly defending a section of the border in Kursk Oblast as of late May 2024, suggesting that there may be some relatively more combat effective forces in the area, but the majority of Russian reporting indicates that most Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast are elements of less combat effective units. [18] The Russian military command may pursue this COA should it assess that lower quality forces that would likely be less well equipped could effectively stop Ukrainian forces that have been reportedly successfully employing innovative tactics and technological capabilities. All of these forces are operating in the area of responsibility (AOR) of Russia's Northern Grouping of Forces, but it is unclear to what degree the Northern Grouping of Forces has authority over these elements' border security functions.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel deployed to the border area in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts as of early May 2024 and reportedly intended to establish a grouping in the area that is between 50,000 to 75,000 personnel in size. [19] The Northern Grouping of Forces likely launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast before it reached its reported planned end strength and has since suffered heavy casualties that have likely constrained Russian efforts to build out the grouping. The Russian military command reportedly transferred an unspecified number of forces to the international border area near Kharkiv Oblast in late May and early June 2024, but it was unclear if the Russian military command planned to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. [20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 8 that the Russian military command began to redeploy forces likely from the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) from the Belgorod group of the Northern Grouping of Forces operating in the Vovchansk direction northeast of Kharkiv City to the group defending the international border in Kursk Oblast. [21] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov attempted on August 7 to portray the Northern Grouping of Forces (as well as the FSB) as an effective defensive force, claiming that these forces stopped Ukraine's advances in Kursk Oblast and inflicted significant casualties. [22] The Northern Grouping of Forces has failed to achieve even its limited tactical objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast since early May 2024 and its ability to conduct effective defensive operations and significant counterattacks is unclear. The redeployment of significant elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces to focus on pushing back Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast would likely further stretch these elements and create vulnerabilities in Russian defenses elsewhere along the border. The Russian military command may also seek to pursue this COA should it deem the Northern Grouping of Forces' offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to be less of a priority than defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory. Russian aviation currently conducts routine sorties to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions throughout the frontline, and the Russian military command may seek to leverage available aviation assets should it determine that the current forces in Kursk Oblast are ill-fitted to retake territory while aiming to avoid redeployments from elsewhere in the theater. The Russian military command may envision that both rotary- and fixed-wing aviation operations at scale in airspace over Kursk Oblast would allow Russian forces to blunt Ukrainian maneuver and prevent Ukrainian forces from securely consolidating positions and thereby allow the current Russian forces deployed in the area to more effectively conduct counterattacks and defensive operations. It is unclear whether the current Russian forces deployed to Kursk Oblast would be able to exploit the effects of large-scale Russian aviation operations over Kursk Oblast, however. It is also unclear if large-scale aviation operations over Kursk Oblast would disrupt Russia's ability to routinely use tactical aviation for glide bomb strikes throughout the frontline. Russian sources have indicated that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, including the "mobile groups" operating further into Russian territory, have significant air defense capabilities that would likely make large-scale Russian aviation operations in the area challenging. [26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating rotary-wing aircraft in certain areas of Kursk Oblast, which would suggest that current Russian air defense coverage in the area may be sparse and may facilitate even limited Ukrainian aviation operations that would further complicate the Russian military's ability to field aviation at scale over Kursk Oblast. [27] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of reported Ukrainian air and air defense capabilities in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces could also deploy ground-based strike capabilities at scale to areas in and near Kursk Oblast to constrain Ukrainian advances and disrupt Ukrainian consolidation at positions within Russia, but Russian forces have generally proven incapable of using longer-range strike capabilities to set conditions for the type of ground maneuver needed to quickly retake territory in Kursk Oblast.

The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise in the past year and a half of fighting due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise highlights that the widespread visual and sensor-based transparency that both sides have established does not translate into a fully transparent battlefield, however, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity around operational intent to achieve operational surprise. One Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command for failing to observe and react to Ukrainian forces allegedly massing on the border near Kursk Oblast. [28] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continually warned the Russian high command about a massing of Ukrainian forces along the border near Kursk Oblast but that the Russian command failed to adequately prepare for potential Ukrainian offensive operations. [29] Ukrainian forces would have successfully concealed their operational intent in order to achieve operational surprise if milblogger claims that Russian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces in border areas are accurate. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have failed to internalize lessons learned about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on an assumed transparent battlefield in Ukraine. [30] Ukraine, however, appears to be learning and adapting to this aspect of the battlefield given its ability to achieve apparent operational surprise in this instance .

Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that Russia "brought the war to Ukraine" and must "feel what it has done" in response. [31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak acknowledged the ongoing "events" in Kursk Oblast and noted that Russia is to blame for the situation, and an unnamed advisor to Zelensky also acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian military operation into Kursk Oblast during an interview with the Washington Post on August 8. [32]

US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on August 8 that Ukraine's operation into Kursk Oblast is consistent with US policy and that the US supports Ukraine's right to defend itself against attacks across the international border. [33] White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller also noted the Biden Administration's support for Ukraine's "common sense" and defensive actions on August 7. [34] Unnamed "US and Ukrainian officials" told CNN on August 8 that Ukrainian forces hope to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and partially divert Russian forces from frontline areas in eastern Ukraine. [35]

Russian-backed Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 8 that there are no plans to construct a Russian naval base at the Ochamchire port in Russian-controlled Abkhazia, Georgia. [36] Shamba noted that Russian forces have stationed border patrol boats at the port. Shamba stated in January 2024 that Russia was designing a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, however, and Russian-backed Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania announced in October 2023 that he signed an agreement with Russian authorities to construct the base near Ochamchire. [37] Naval News reported in July 2024 that the Russian Project 22870 support ship, which had been previously docked at its home port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, arrived at the Ochamchire port. [38] It is unclear why the Russian government would abandon its plans to construct a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, as Ukrainian strikes against Black Sea Fleet assets have largely rendered naval basing in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea useless and have forced Russia to seek a more permanent basing pattern in the eastern Black Sea. [39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.
• Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.
• The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.
• COA (Course of Action) 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.
• COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.
• The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.
• Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
• US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on August 7 and 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. [40] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on August 8 that Russian forces recently transferred an unspecified unit from occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces did not use tactical aviation in the Kharkiv direction on August 8. [41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Hlyboke. [42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove and Kolisnykivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novoserhiivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on August 7 and 8. [43]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on August 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on August 5 against a command post of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) near occupied Bohdanivka, Luhansk Oblast, killing the battalion's commander and several Russian officers. [44] ISW cannot independently confirm this report.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, Spirne, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 7 and 8. [45] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka and Pereizne. [46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske on August 7 and 8. [47] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar. [48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance within Niu York (south of Toretsk) and that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the area. [49] Russian forces also continued offensive operations near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Pivnichne, and southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne on August 7 and 8. [50] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Niu York. [51]

Russian forces reportedly advanced east of Pokrovsk on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating east of Pokrovsk advanced up to the outskirts of Hrodivka and near Lysychne and Ivanivka. [52] Russian milbloggers also continued to claim that Russian forces seized Serhiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). [53] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka; east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Ivanivka, and Lysychne; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Zhelanne, Karlivka, and Yasnobrodivka on August 7 and 8. [54]

Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Donetsk City on August 8 but did not make confirmed gains in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [55] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, Vodyane, Volodymyrivka, and Vuhledar on August 7 and 8. [56] Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City). [57]

Russian forces recently made marginal gains south of Velyka Novosilka in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, but Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report fighting in the area on August 8. Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains northeast of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka). [58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and 8. [59]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the Dnipro direction (Kherson Oblast) on August 7 and 8. [60] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta. [61]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian drone over occupied Crimea on August 8. [62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 7 to 8. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles from over the Sea of Azov, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and four Shahed-136/131 drones from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down two Kh-59 cruise missiles and four Shahed drones over Odesa, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts. [63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues efforts to limit violations to Russian military operational security in Ukraine and control the distribution of information about the Russian military to the information space. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a law on August 8 that makes the use of electronic "gadgets" (personal phones and electronic devices) by Russian military personnel in the combat zone in Ukraine to perform tasks that are not part of their official duties a disciplinary offense punishable by up to 10 days of arrest. [64] The law does not apply to military personnel using electronic "gadgets" to perform their official duties, however. The law also states that military personnel who distribute information about Russian military activities, unit deployments, or servicemembers' families to the media or on the internet face the same punishment. Russian milbloggers previously widely criticized the State Duma proposals allowing for the punishment of servicemembers for using "gadgets" in the combat zone, claiming that this would significantly complicate Russian logistics, command and control, and operations in general, and the final law's permission for Russian personnel to use these devices to perform their official tasks are likely in response to this backlash. [65]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted footage on August 8 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver ammunition and evacuate wounded personnel in frontline areas of eastern Ukraine. [66] The milblogger claimed that acting Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov supported the production of the UGVs and noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) design bureau is testing several UGVs.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Belarusian Hajun project reported on August 8 that at least nine Russian Shahed-136/131 drones flew into Belarusian airspace from July 11 to 31. [67] The Hajun project reported that one drone fell in Belarus, that seven flew to Ukrainian airspace, and that it is unclear what happened to one drone. Belarusian forces are reportedly taking measures to protect against Russian drones by flying Su-30SM aircraft in southern Belarus during Russian air strikes against Ukraine and redeploying Belarusian helicopters to the Babruysk Airbase to shorten the flight time to the Ukrainian-Belarusian border to intercept drones.

Belarusian and Russian officials took further steps to increase Belarusian-Russian cooperation through the Union State. Union State Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev and Belarusian Security Council State Secretary Alexander Volfovich met in Minsk on August 8 and discussed the final draft of the Union State's Security Concept, which the Council of Ministers and the Supreme State Council of the Union State will reportedly consider in the near future. [68] Mezentsev and Volfovich reportedly discussed the Supreme State Council of the Union State's programs to improve Belarusian and Russian forces' infrastructure and rear facilities. Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov also met on August 8 in Minsk and reportedly discussed preparation for the signing of the Union State's Security Concept. [69] The National Bank of Belarus and Central Bank of Russia signed an agreement on August 7 on cooperation and information exchanges related to the supervision and control of the financial market, implementing aspects of the Treaty of the Establishment of the Union State.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/dva_majors/49120 ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16342 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127888 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25888

[2] https://t.me/notes_veterans/18606 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18628 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58028 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58026 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25900 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74285  ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27567 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127828 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16342 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58037 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/rybar/62546

[3] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6299?single ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1962 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49143 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49120  ; https://t.me/mig41/35945 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74283 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74295  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49096

[4] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1821621690717085870 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38431 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74252 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9412 ; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1821345068885647545 ; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1821311435131027729 ;  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  

[5] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13548 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127920 ; https://x.com/ian_matveev/status/1821598298286731687 ; https://x.com/Militarylandnet/status/1821604070735614061 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/84455 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132781

[6] https://t.me/dva_majors/49120 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/rybar/62576 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127830 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25905 ; http://t.me/mig41/35981 ; https://t.me/rybar/62563 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1958 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74296 ; https://t.me/sashakots/48269 ; https://t.me/rybar/62576 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  

; https://t.me/dva_majors/49075 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18571 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127888 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25888 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49087 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13548 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13589

[7] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58037 ; https://t.me/rybar/62546 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132710 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18601 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25904 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127828 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132741 ; https://t.me/mig41/35943 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74267 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74272 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49154 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38853

[8] https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13527 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132810

[9] https://t.me/rybar/62580 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132810

[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/49133 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13578 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/32633; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58052

[11] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74725

[12] https://t.me/russianocontext/4252 ; https://t.me/rybar/62581 ; https://t.me/breakingmash/56581 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13571

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/264864 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/264865; https://t.me/tass_agency/264868 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060223

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024

[16] https://t.me/rybar/62546 ; ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12484 ; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1821300140755271836 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49735 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58023 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41905 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12484 ; https://t.me/russianocontext/4248 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19726 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49141 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74281 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49098 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49158 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38851

[17] https://t.me/motopatriot/25903 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902

[18] https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2024

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824

[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2101

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate080122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824

[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58025

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/49083 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13537

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58056 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58053

[28] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16803

[29] https://t.me/rybar/62558 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16803

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024

[31] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/rosiya-prinesla-vijnu-na-nashu-zemlyu-j-povinna-vidchuvati-s-92549

[32] https://t.me/M_Podolyak/273 ; https://t.me/M_Podolyak/274 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/08/ukraine-kursk-russia-occupied-war/

[33] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3867296/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-conference/

[34] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/08/07/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-66/ ; https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-7-2024/

[35] https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/08/europe/russia-ukrainian-incursion-intl/index.html

[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/265131  

[37] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6452529 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13524  

[41] https://t.me/otukharkiv/670 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/08/vijska-rf-ne-vidhodyat-z-harkivshhyny-popry-boyi-u-kurskij-oblasti/

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13524  

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[44] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12504 ; https://t.me/pechalbeda200/101483

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[46] https://t.me/rusich_army/16341

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/41903

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13564 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25879

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ;

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/21459

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot/25873 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25874 ; https://t.me/rybar/62568

[53] https://t.me/rybar/62568  ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25878 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74303  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74246 ; https://t.me/rybar/62568 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132717

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27564 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132772

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/49060

[58] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/18220; https://t.me/ukraine20obsp/770

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ;

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/21467

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/41921

[63] https://t.me/ComAFUA/377

[64] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21561113; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202408080028

[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324

[66] https://t.me/rybar/62562

[67] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8032

[68] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/zavershena-sovmestnaja-rabota-nad-proektom-kontseptsii-bezopasnosti-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-652996-2024/

[69] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/ryzhenkov-i-gryzlov-obsudili-podgotovku-proekta-belorussko-rossijskogo-dogovora-o-garantijah-653049-2024/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43980

• Afghanistan
• Sign up for Email Updates

Sunday, August 4, 2024

Russian offensive campaign assessment, august 4, 2024.

Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against an oil depot in Rostov Oblast and missile strikes against fuel storage warehouses in occupied Luhansk City on August 4.
• Ukraine confirmed that it has received the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets.
• Russian milbloggers responded to the arrival of F-16s by trying to downplay their potential battlefield effects—directly undermining Russian information operations intended to frame the delivery of F-16s and other Western weapons systems as an uncrossable "red line."
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances east of Pokrovsk, west of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• The Russian defense industry reportedly continues to produce missiles using Western-sourced components.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Positional engagements continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City in and near Vovchansk and near Tykhe. [13] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are transferring additional reserves to northern Kharkiv Oblast and conducting limited rotations near both Hlyboke and Vovchansk. [14] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on August 4 that the Russian military command has transferred responsibility for positions in northern Vovchansk from elements of the 4th Volunteer Assault Brigade to elements of the 153rd Tank Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]). [15]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Berestove, Kruhlyakivka, Petropavlivka, Kolisnykivka, Novoosynove, and Hlushkivka; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; and northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Terny. [16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance within central Makiivka. [17]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on August 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources continued to discuss Russian combat operations in Zhovtnevyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar) and claimed that Russian forces are clearing newly seized positions in the area. [21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka and claimed that Russian forces seized a Ukrainian stronghold at a key height southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. [22] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kalynivka; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 3 and 4. [23] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov published footage purporting to show elements of the “Shustry” Detachment of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz and the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) operating in the Chasiv Yar direction. [24]

Russian forces reportedly advanced southeast of Toretsk but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area on August 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer west of southwestern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and have entered the administrative boundaries of Toretsk, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. [25] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Pivnichne, southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne, south of Toretsk near Niu York, and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka on August 3 and 4. [26]

Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk and reportedly made further gains in the area on August 4. Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced further within Vesele (east of Pokrovsk) and have seized most of the settlement. [27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 4 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Novoselivka Persha (southeast of Pokrovsk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of July 29. [28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer in depth and 2.35 kilometers in width west of Novoselivka Persha towards Mezhove (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced further within Ivanivka (east of Pokrovsk). [29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the northeastern outskirts of Zhelanne (southeast of Pokrovsk) and are approaching the northwestern outskirts of the settlement. [30] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka; east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Hrodivka, Vesele, Svyrydonivka, Tymofiivka, Lysychne, and Ivanivka; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka, Novoselivka Persha, Zhelanne, Serhiivka, Mezhove, Skuchne, Yasnobrodivka, and Karlivka on August 3 and 4. [31] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces rarely conduct mechanized assaults in the area and have been relying on infantry heavy tactics since June 2024. [32] Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction. [33]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on August 4. Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced further within northern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and within southeastern Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City). [34] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 3 and 4 that Russian forces advanced further on the northwestern outskirts of Krasnohorivka and have intensified assaults on Kostyantynivka following significant Russian artillery preparation in the area. [35] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on August 3 and 4. [36] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the direction of Romanivka (southwest of Donetsk City). [37] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City). [38]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 3 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked near Robotyne; north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka; and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on August 3 and 4. [42]

Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces likely damaged one S-400 launcher and destroyed another S-400 launcher near occupied Kush-Kaya, Crimea in an August 2 missile strike. [45] A Crimea-focused Telegram channel claimed that the August 2 Ukrainian strikes against the Russian Black Sea Fleet's Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine at the Sevastopol port did not sink the submarine. [46] Commercially available satellite imagery via Planet Labs PBC captured on August 2 suggests that Ukrainian forces damaged the submarine, but ISW cannot yet independently verify reports that the Ukrainian strike destroyed the submarine, nor the extent of damage the strike inflicted. [47] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on August 4 that Russian forces are essentially no longer using two of the five Russian military airfields in occupied Crimea after recent Ukrainian strikes against the peninsula. [48]

[1] https://t.me/astrapress/61170

[2] https://t.me/golubev_vu/1471 ; https://t.me/golubev_vu/1472

[3] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2720

[4] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2720

[5] https://t.me/rusich_army/16242 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1820093998914007355 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127536 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73976

[6] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/20453

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11283 ;

[8] https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/08/04/how-much-of-a-difference-will-ukraines-new-f-16s-make https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/11283; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1820103944435007620  

[9] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate080122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062224

[10] https://t.me/rybar/62428; htt ps://t.me/fighter_bomber/17621 ; https://t.me/sashakots/48196

[11] https://tass dot com/politics/1620545; https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-alexander-grushko-warns-west-f16-jets-ukraine-carries-enormous-risks-tass/

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024 ;

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/562; https://t.me/wargonzo/21370; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13347; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11098; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13345; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73947; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11098

[14] https://t.me/wargonzo/21370 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11098

[15] https://t.me/otukharkiv/562

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql

[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73947

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0U5WwSgcnVbyoWW6Be7iK2zHzuMeots5pUiGSoRizuKN4i4Y9XRQLvR3nZqJEqjcnl ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16235

[19] https://t.me/evgeniy_lisitsyn/11206; https://t.me/sashakots/48195

[20] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/16002

[21] https://t.me/rybar/62414; https://t.me/motopatriot/25821

[22] https://t.me/rybar/62414 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13366

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0U5WwSgcnVbyoWW6Be7iK2zHzuMeots5pUiGSoRizuKN4i4Y9XRQLvR3nZqJEqjcnl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41780 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41786 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21370 ;

[24] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4970

[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6246 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27511

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0U5WwSgcnVbyoWW6Be7iK2zHzuMeots5pUiGSoRizuKN4i4Y9XRQLvR3nZqJEqjcnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21370

[27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6247; https://t.me/Gvardeiskaia30OMSBR/177

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/41787 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2024

[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73947 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27509

[30] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18539

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0U5WwSgcnVbyoWW6Be7iK2zHzuMeots5pUiGSoRizuKN4i4Y9XRQLvR3nZqJEqjcnl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18539 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21370 ;

[32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/04/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-pokrovskyj-napryamok-kyshyt-rosiyanamy/

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132289

[34] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/846 ; https://x.com/AF_LABS1/status/1820050165706653725 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6253; https://t.me/odshbr79/261

[35] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18535 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13344 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25812

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0U5WwSgcnVbyoWW6Be7iK2zHzuMeots5pUiGSoRizuKN4i4Y9XRQLvR3nZqJEqjcnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21370 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18535 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13344 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25812

[37] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12544

[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73928

[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6254;

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl

[41] https://t.me/voin_dv/10103 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10101

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02nDkmJAb9uJKoyHFY67Pd7sqsvuyvZWvwDgJGsDyztSqaNYFDpWcb33wV1kf2kiQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Eptso5toCPnzwV2eRV96JdodRqrYwyxvRfrRarr8wjBTiUQBhwLML9RA5BztPtoql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0U5WwSgcnVbyoWW6Be7iK2zHzuMeots5pUiGSoRizuKN4i4Y9XRQLvR3nZqJEqjcnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21370

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/41785

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/41768

[45] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9308 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/64940

[46] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/64944

[47] Imagery Courtesy of Planet Labs PBC.

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/04/u-krymu-na-dvoh-aerodromah-v-okupantiv-majzhe-ne-lyshylosya-litakiv/

[49] https://t.me/ComAFUA/368

[50] https://suspilne dot media/poltava/806009-u-mirgorodskij-tg-na-poltavsini-vnaslidok-obstrilu-poskodzeno-40-budinkiv/; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/5932

[51] https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/1820010455596700124 ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/26233

[52] https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/12054 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48738

[53] https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/sanctions-and-reality-western-techs ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1819960215514624483

[54] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/239f756e2e6b49a5bec78f5c5248bf3d

[55] https://tass dot ru/politika/21526839 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/264294

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/264295

[57] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16752 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132316 ; https://t.me/svarschiki/9939 ; https://t.me/rybar/62423

[58] https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1368&page=8